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Abstract
The Northeast Passage underwater fibre cable connection (Arctic Connect) has been studied for
several years. The underwater part of the system would consist of a connection of about 10,500
kilometres from Japan and China to Kirkkoniemi in Norway and the Kuola peninsula in Russia. It
would enable several landfall points to be established on this route in Northern Russia.
The cable connection would make it possible to implement a fast physical telecommunications
route from Asia to Northern and Central Europe via Norway, Russia and Finland. This would be
possible because it would be connected to the Baltic fibre cable connection between Helsinki and
Rostock. In addition to providing speed, the cable would also respond to the rapidly increasing
need for capacity and would provide a reliable alternative to the risky southern routes.
The Northeast Passage cable project would be broad and multinational, and implementation
would require commitments from at least Russia, China, Japan, Norway and the relevant EU
countries. In addition, the European Union would have a significant role in the international cable
project both as a beneficiary and in providing funding.
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Summary of the rapporteurs’ report on the 
Northeast Passage sea cable 
  
On 2 May 2016, the Minister of Transport and Communications Anne Berner appointed former 
Prime Minister and Master of Political Science Paavo Lipponen and former CEO of FiCom and 
Master of Laws Reijo Svento to be the rapporteurs responsible for producing a report on the pre-
requisites for international cooperation to initiate the Northeast Passage cable project.  
 
The rapporteurs delivered their report to Minister Berner on 10 November 2016. This is a summary 
of that larger report. 
 
1. Background work 
The Northeast Passage submarine fibre cable connection (Arctic Connect) has been a subject of 
investigation for a number of years. The system’s submarine section would consist of an approxi-
mately 10,500 kilometre connection from Japan and China to Kirkkoniemi in Norway and Russia’s 
Kola Peninsula. This would enable the creation of a number of landing points for the cable along 
Russia’s northern coast.  
 
With this cable connection, it would be possible to create the fastest physical telecommunications 
route from Asia to Northern and Central Europe via Norway, Russia, and Finland. This would be 
possible once the cable is connected to the Baltic Sea fibre cable connection between Helsinki and 
Rostock. In addition to the extra speed, the cable would respond to the rapidly growing need for 
extra capacity and would create a reliable alternative to risk-prone southern routes. 
 
The Northeast Passage cable project would be broad and multinational, and its execution would 
demand international commitment from, at the very least, Russia, China, Japan, Norway and the 
relevant EU countries. In addition, the European Union could have a significant role in this interna-
tional cable project as both a beneficiary and a funder.  
 
2. Questions for the Finnish embassies 
In the early stages of their work, the rapporteurs sent questions via the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs to a large number of Finnish embassies to inquire about the possible attitudes of each coun-
tries towards the project. The questions were delivered to the Finnish embassies in Sweden, Nor-
way, Denmark, Iceland, Estonia, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Germany, Bel-
gium, Holland, France, Canada, the US, India, Great Britain, Italy and Finland’s representation to 
the EU in Brussels. 
 
3. Analysis of responses 
The whole project and the idea of laying a telecommunications cable between Europe and Asia via 
the Northeast Passage was a surprisingly new one to the majority of the countries. In these coun-
tries the issue has therefore received little attention by politicians, officials, and the media. Similar-
ly, it was therefore also rather difficult to make clear estimates of the decision-making mechanisms 
that would be involved. 
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In contrast, the project and idea were familiar in those countries which it would directly involve. In 
addition to Finland, these countries were Norway, Sweden, Russia, China and Japan. Also, the 
project was familiar to some officials within the EU administration, primarily those from DG Con-
nect.  
With regards to the preliminary standpoints of both those countries that were unfamiliar with the 
project and those that were more familiar with it, the following can be said: 
The need for and benefit of the project is understood well. The more concretely the project affects 
a particular country, the greater the interest in it. In the more affected countries, it can also be more 
clearly discerned what the related political decision-making mechanism is who the key decision-
makers are. 
 
4. Visits to key capital cities 
 
During their work on the report, the rapporteurs visited Oslo, Berlin, Paris, Brussels (EU), London, 
Tokyo, Peking, Washington and Moscow. In all the capital cities, and also in the European Com-
mission, they met with high-level political decision makers and officials from ministries responsible 
for administration of foreign affairs, communications and industrial policy. In addition, they engaged 
in discussions with representatives from the administration of the country’s prime minister / chan-
cellor. In the EU, they met with commissioners, heads of cabinet and director-generals. In many 
countries visited, they also met with large telecommunications companies, including Alcatel-Lucent 
(Nokia), NEC, Fujitsu, KDDI, NTT, Softbank, Huawei etc. Additionally, direct and indirect contact 
was made outside the visits with other companies, including Microsoft, Facebook and Google. 
 
In all the countries, there was understanding of the need for and large significance of the project. 
The countries expressed interest in being involved in the project and expressed willingness to sup-
port the success of the project by taking a favourable attitude towards the official permits that may 
be required for the project’s realisation. 
 
Two things considered important in all places, however, was that the project would offer genuine 
business opportunities and that private funders and investors would participate in financing the 
project. It was also seen to be possible to channel finance for the project implementation via differ-
ent regional development banks and funds. 
 
The project was seen to be technically challenging, but not impossible. In the most challenging 
stretches, a channel would need to be dug into the seabed to a depth of many metres. It was esti-
mated that the project would take a number of years to complete. 
 
The project was generally seen to be an essential part of joint Arctic policy in northern regions. It 
was stated that the project, once completed, would further economic activity and competitiveness 
in the project’s regions of impact in Europe, Russia and Asia. 
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5. Observations made by the rapporteurs 
5.1 Positive factors 
It can be said that the project in itself is received positively and its need and justifications are un-
derstood. In general, it is comprehended that this is a win-win-win situation. The beneficiaries 
would be Europe, Russia and Asia. 
The project is seen to have both direct and indirect positive economic impacts on the development 
of each party’s national economy. With a fast and safe telecommunications connection, it is possi-
ble to improve the international competitiveness of businesses in these regions, and there is also a 
greater certainty that telecommunications investments would be secured in these same areas, for 
example through the creation of data centres. These regions would be able to form better interna-
tional telecommunication hubs, with experience shows to be factor which then draws in businesses 
from other spheres. 
The implementation of the project would significantly reduce the telecommunications time delay 
(latency) between Europe and Asia, meaning the time it takes for one bit of data to travel from one 
end of the connection to the other. This time delay is of great importance to banks, stock exchange 
trading and the gaming industry, as well as the internet of things and the growing amount of remote 
surveillance and remote control taking place using 5G. This affects, for example, robotic vehicles. 
With the international situation, as is well known, being tense for a number of reasons, the different 
parties are eager to engage in neutral technical cooperation that could help to ease tensions. The 
Northeast Passage cable project is an excellent candidate for such a project. 
The finance for the project could possibly be obtained both in Europe and Asia via a number of 
international financing instruments. Private investors have also shown interest in financing the pro-
ject. 
One positive factor can be said to be the positive attitude of all the key countries towards the pro-
ject and their stated willingness to see to it that the granting of permits required for the project pro-
ceeds as smoothly as possible. 
5.2 Challenges 
Based on the discussions had, the largest challenges for the project relate to data security. In a 
delicate international political climate, different countries direct strong suspicions towards each 
other with regards to data security, protection of privacy and other cyber-related matters.  
Although it would be possible to establish the cable connection in such a way that communications 
between Europe and Asia would be routed using the end-to-end system (without using Russian 
territory), special difficulties would be faced by the consortium that manages the data communica-
tions and, in particular, the company that carries this out in practice. Neutrality is especially im-
portant.  
Some of the parties take the view that sea cable projects should primarily be purely commercial 
projects carried out by private businesses. Based on the discussions had, they nevertheless un-
derstand the necessity of obtaining political commitment in such a special case as this one. Often 
sea cables directly connect the two parties involved across the intervening sea without the need to 
lay the cable along the coastline and territorial waters of another state.  
The funding of the project also raises many questions. Who would fund and how much? Why 
would states be involved? And the questions continue. Clarifying such matters does not fall within 
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the remit of this report, but these issues were so prominent in the discussions conducted that they 
cannot go without mention. 
It should be mentioned that the project involves a number of chicken-and-egg scenarios. Public 
bodies want to be certain of genuine commercial interest and the realisation of the extra capacity 
created by the connection. At the same time, commercial entities are waiting for the removal of 
political obstacles to activity before making clearer plans for the project etc. Regarding this second 
requirement, significant progress has now been made and political obstacles are no longer present 
on a wide scale. 
In a similar way, different states and the EU are waiting to hear the opinions of other states before 
finalising more detailed positions of their own.  
In some of the discussions, environmental questions were highlighted, not so much with regards to 
the sea cable itself as to its indirect impacts. Will the improved telecommunications connection 
facilitate the inappropriate use of Arctic resources, causing a greater burden on the environment?  
In some discussions the issue was also raised of the Canadian project to lay a Northwest Passage 
cable that would be equivalent to the Northeast Passage cable. This cannot, however, be seen as 
straight alternative to the Northeast Passage cable, as it would benefit neither Asia nor Russia. 
The project should be technologically and commercially neutral. All stages should be carried out 
through open tendering.  
In addition, the project is in any case a technically challenging one owing to the natural conditions 
in the region. In some discussions, the thought was raised of a smaller-scale pilot project that could 
be implemented before starting the project as a whole. 
5.3 Funding perspectives 
Although questions of financing do not come under the remit of this report, there is reason to state 
at the least the following on this matter: 
Division of costs 
No party was willing to be the sole funder for such a large project. The inclusion of public funding is 
possible and, in fact, also essential in the project’s early stages. In the longer-term, the company 
should be able to operate on a purely commercial basis. 
One financing model that was seen to be workable involved a three-way split between public fund-
ing, financing from the consortium that would be formed, and loan finance. There can be a number 
of different financing models, and their more precise specification would take place in the next 
stage of the project. 
From the discussions it arose that it would be possible to obtain financing for the project through 
different kinds of institutional financing mechanisms. These could include, for example, the Asian 
Development Bank, EBRD, EIB, and EU. 
Preliminary interest has also been shown among private investors in participating in project financ-
ing. One possibility is also the use of ‘vendor finance’, meaning that the companies chosen to carry 
out the project also participate in financing the project. 
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6. Opportunities 
6.1 Part of broader Arctic policy 
It is natural to connect the cable project with Arctic policy at a wider level. Many countries through 
which the cable does not itself run are interested in Arctic policy for reasons related to research 
and natural resources. These countries include Germany, France, England and the US. 
Arctic policy is often seen as a common matter, and there is a desire to avoid letting it become the 
monopoly of any one state. This attitude is ideal for smoothing the path towards the project’s im-
plementation. 
Interest in Arctic policy has clearly increased in all the capitals visited. The drafting process for the 
EU’s communication prompted a number of countries (for example Germany) to draft their own 
Arctic policy programme. Similarly, France published in June 2016 its own Arctic roadmap. The 
EU’s Foreign Affairs Council considered the Commission’s communication and made decisions on 
the matter. In these, the implementation and monitoring of the communication remained unclear. 
There has also been discussion of the communication in the European parliament, where a report 
on the matter is being prepared.  
In spite of Brexit, the UK wishes to strengthen its polar policy. The EU should see to it that, as 
Brexit is implemented, Great Britain is offered participation in the Arctic Council (as an observer) 
and partnership in cooperation on Nordic matters together with the other current partners (the EU, 
Russia, Norway and Iceland). 
Finland’s coming Chairmanship of the Arctic Council was highlighted by the rapporteurs and it was 
found that this offers Finland an opportunity to take a leading role in making Arctic policy a priority. 
Similarly, Finland’s coming Chairmanship of the Arctic Economic Council will serve for awakening 
interest among European businesses. 
Japan, China, and Russia all indicated willingness to support a strong emphasis being placed on 
the project in the Arctic Council. Some even considered it a necessity to discuss the project in the 
Council. 
6.2 Finland’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2017–2019 
Finland will take over the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council at the start of 2017. The year in ques-
tion is also, as is well known, Finland’s 100-year anniversary of independence. Finland should 
work purposefully to get the cable project onto the Arctic Council’s agenda. 
6.3 Economic growth in beneficiary countries 
Evidence shows that good telecommunications connections have a positive impact on the econom-
ic growth and international competitiveness of regions that benefit from them. 
Europe and Asia are in danger of falling behind the US in this area of development. The Northeast 
Passage cable would make enable extra investment by large international players in, for example, 
data centres in Nordic countries. In the longer term, these then have the tendency to attract others 
into the same region.  
As a hub for Nordic countries and for the Baltic Sea and Northeast Passage cables in particular, 
Finland would be even better placed to become a hub for international data transfer in the same 
way as it is for air traffic between Europe and Asia. 
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In all conversations, the issue also arose of the project’s potential to partially transfer the interna-
tional internet network’s centre of gravity away from the US. Currently a significant portion of com-
munications between Europe and Asia first cross the Atlantic to the US and then continue from 
there over the Pacific to Asia. This considerably increases the time delay for data transfer. 
6.4 WIN-WIN-WIN situation (Europe-Russia-Asia)  
The Northeast Passage cable would be an unusual sea cable due to the fact that it would have a 
number of direct beneficiaries. Sea cables are normally simply laid directly between two states or 
regions. 
The beneficiaries of the Northeast Passage cable would be both Asia and Europe, located at the 
ends of the cable, as well as Russia, which is situated along much of the route. 
This makes the cable more than a win-win situation: it is a win-win-win situation. 
By laying the sea cable, it would be possible to significantly reduce the length of the data connec-
tion between Europe and Asia. At the moment, the data in sea cables travels to Asia either via the 
Mediterranean, Suez Canal and Indian Ocean or via the US. 
Air traffic currently benefits from shorter routes via the north of Finland and Russia that avoid the 
so-called ‘big circle’ route, and the same should be achieved for data as well. 
6.5 Russia has its own large needs 
Russia itself has a clear need to improve data connections in its northern regions. The area has 
even large cities which are lacking good data connections. The same applies to the area’s industry. 
With the use of the Northeast Passage route becoming possible also for sea traffic, Russia intends 
to invest heavily in the exploitation of the area’s natural resources. These plans also require better 
data connections than before. Russia itself currently has a number of programmes in operation for 
developing its northern regions. 
6.6 Technical implementation 
It is possible to lay the sea cable in such a way that a couple of the 6–8 fibre pairs running through 
the cable would be allocated for Russia’s own use. Only these fibre pairs are the ones that would 
be routed onto land at locations specified by Russia.  
The other fibre pairs would run directly from one end to the other, between Europe and Asia.  
The sea cable would split in two at both the European and Asian ends. At the European end, one 
branch would extend to Norway and the other would terminate at Russia’s Kola Peninsula. In Asia, 
one branch would go to Japan and the other to China. In addition, the cable can begin to be laid 
simultaneously at both the European and the Asian ends. 
 
7. Summary 
The rapporteurs have collected as much earlier material as possible and have discussed the pro-
ject with officials and business representatives that have dealt with the project earlier. 
The rapporteurs sent key questions to a significant number of Finnish embassies, via the Finnish 
Foreign Ministry, to enquire about each country’s attitudes towards the cable project. Based on the 
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responses received, it can be seen that the project is a familiar one primarily in those countries 
which are concretely affected by it. The European Commission was also aware of the project. 
The rapporteurs made visits to Oslo, Paris, Berlin, Brussels, London, Tokyo, Peking, Washington 
and twice to Moscow. In every location visited, a large number of discussions were had with politi-
cal decision-makers, officials and businesses. 
Based on these discussions, it could be seen that the need for and opportunities offered by the 
project were understood and its implementation was seen as desirable.  
Based on their wide-ranging investigation and large number of discussions conducted with 
high level political officials, the rapporteurs can unambiguously state that there are no polit-
ical obstacles to the project’s realisation.  
The rapporteurs also had many discussions about the project’s technical feasibility with some of 
the world’s largest businesses that have carried out similar projects in other maritime areas. All of 
them considered the project to be possible to carry out, although it would be technically challeng-
ing. There are only a few summer months when the cable could be laid, and in some areas the 
cable would have to be laid in a deep trench on the sea bed because of the large icebergs the 
move through those areas. An ideal way to speed up the project would be to start laying the cable 
simultaneously at both the Asian and European ends. This is technically possible and the cables 
can then be joined at some point along the Russian coast. 
The sea cable can be technically configured so that the data between Europe and Asia travels 
along its own fibre pairs directly from one end to the other to ensure the lowest possibly time delay 
(latency). At its lowest, the time delay is estimated to be only 100 milliseconds. Currently, it is 
clearly over twice this amount.  
The challenges are related to technical implementation, financing, and managing the data commu-
nications. These matters did not, as such, come under the remit of this investigation, but they came 
up in many discussions. The project should be moved forward quickly into the next implementation 
phase, in which the issues mentioned above would be more thoroughly investigated and resolved. 
This will enable states, businesses and the various potential funding and investment bodies to 
make their final decision as to whether the project should be realised. Some kind of business 
should lead the project, as only a business can apply for the required permits and financing. During 
their work on the report, the rapporteurs have also been either directly or indirectly in touch with 
different funding and investment bodies from both the public and private sector. A number of bod-
ies in both Europe and Asia seemed interested in financing the project. There was also interest 
among a number of large international businesses in the opportunity to benefit as users of the fast 
connection provided by the sea cable. 
In addition to the technical challenges of implementing the project, security questions and protec-
tion of privacy were also seen as challenges. Neutrality was seen to be important. 
The project involves a number of chicken-and-egg dilemmas. Different countries, and the EU also, 
are first of all particularly interested in each other’s attitude towards the project. Similarly, busi-
nesses are waiting for the removal of political obstacles to project implementation while public bod-
ies are waiting at the same time for sure indications of commercial interest and some understand-
ing of the possible consortium that could form, with particular emphasis on which organisation 
would in the end manage the international data transfer. 
The rapporteurs’ work has succeeded in alleviating these chicken-and-egg dilemmas as it is possi-
ble to state that there does not seem to be any political obstacles to the project. Businesses can 
thus begin to move forward more freely and rapidly than before.  
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The project is also seen as an excellent opportunity to achieve a win-win-win (Europe-Russia-Asia) 
result which would be technical and neutral in character. The project could serve to alleviate ten-
sions between the different parties involved. There is good reason to connect the project to wider 
Arctic policy and to Finland’s coming Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. If it would be possible, as 
part of the work of the Arctic Council, to hold a summit of state leaders in connection with Finland’s 
100-year anniversary of independence, it would be good to get this project onto the agenda for that 
meeting. 
The project is of at least medium length, and will involve a number of different stages. The first 
stage is the removal of political ambiguity. In the following stage, there is the need to form a clear 
launch project or company that can gather the relevant parties (in particular businesses) to make 
the necessary studies and reports, including charts of the sea bed and other such matters. Only a 
company can apply for financing and the required official permits from the countries concerned.  
At the same time, ongoing discussions need to be maintained at the level of officials and political 
decision-makers for the securing of international financing and the required permits.  
In the following stage, the project progresses through a process of open competition to the selec-
tion of manufacturers and sea cable layers. The manufacture of a cable for a distance of well over 
10,000 kilometres will in itself take a considerable amount of time, and laying the cable in some 
Arctic areas is possible only during the summer months. From all this it can be concluded that the 
planning and implementation of the project will take a number of years. 
 
8. Rapporteurs’ proposals for action: 
1 Informing key players 
The key countries involved, as well as the EU, have indicated that they have a positive attitude 
towards the project as such. This information should be quickly communicated to all parties in or-
der to facilitate implementation of the project’s following stages. 
2 Ongoing emphasis of the matter at the political and official level 
There is good reason to maintain the matter as a topic of discussion in meetings with political lead-
ers of the key countries involved. The same applies to meetings with officials and the activities of 
embassies in the same countries. 
3 Inclusion of the project as part of Finland’s Arctic policy 
The project should be clearly stated to be a part of Finnish Arctic policy that is to be realised in 
practice. 
4 A strong emphasis on the matter during Finland’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Coun-
cil 
The project should be firmly on the Council’s agenda during Finland's Chairmanship of the Arctic 
Council between 2017 and 2019. The project should not, however, be connected solely with the 
dealings of the Council. It should be possible to carry out the project in other ways as well. 
5 A quick progression to the next stage 
The following stage of the project involves the establishment of a project or company to carry the 
project forward in a more detailed manner. In this stage, companies need to be brought on board, 
10 
 
preferably from a number of the participating countries. The project is an international one, not a bi-
party one. 
There is good reason for Finnish companies to quickly start acting and contacting other actors to 
work on developing the consortium that needs to be formed in the next stage. This consortium 
could also possibly form the basis for the consortium which is in the end responsible for realising 
the project. 
The next stage is not, however, to be carried out solely between businesses. At the same time, 
and presumably in an overlapping manner, cooperation between officials is needed, with permis-
sion for this provided by political decision-makers. 
The next stage can be assumed to require around 4 to 6 million euros for carrying out more de-
tailed reports and drawing up more detailed plans. It must be ensured that these funds can be se-
cured quickly and some of this funding should clearly come from businesses. 
6 Keeping the project neutral 
It must be ensured that it is possible to keep the project neutral with regards to both the technology 
and the implementing parties. All stages of implementation should be based on open tendering.  
 
 
 
 
  
